Tracking progress of individual countries towards a collective global climate target requires a hierarchy of indicators spanning different levels of detail and time periods (Fig. 1) . At the aggregate level one could track global temperature, atmospheric concentrations, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 2, 3 ; CO 2 emissions are particularly relevant due to their dominant role in climate policy and long-lasting effect in perturbing the climate system. Global CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry are projected 3 to be 36.4 GtCO 2 in 2016, approximately the same as in 2014 and 2015, indicating that growth in global CO 2 emissions has stalled for the third year in a row 11 . Although this is a positive step towards addressing climate change, cumulative emissions are still rising and emissions need to rapidly decrease until they reach zero to remain consistent with the Paris Agreement 1 . More relevant for policy implementation is to track progress nationally to assess historical and future trends in emissions [4] [5] [6] , progress towards emission pledges 14 , and the adequacy of pledges to achieve global targets 1 16 . It is not clear if the driving forces behind these global and country-level trends will be sustained. If the observed trends are driven by strengthening of energy and climate policies, then good progress can be expected towards achieving the NDCs, with flexibility to raise mitigation ambitions. If the trends are largely due to lingering economic weakness 17 , or other short-term factors, then emissions growth may rebound 18 . Disentangling the factors causing short-term changes in emissions is therefore critical, otherwise current or future policies may be inconsistent with emission pledges 1 . The implementation of the Paris Agreement requires a consistent and harmonized approach to track progress at different levels of detail and over different time periods. The Kaya Identity is one such approach 5 , in which different components form an interconnected and nested structure (Fig. 1 , see Methods). Each component of the identity can be decomposed into measurable indicators directly impacted by energy and climate policy 5 , which themselves can be further decomposed. Many countries already express their climate policies in terms of Kaya components, such as the energy intensity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or sub-components such as the share of non-fossil energy in total energy use 7 . The indicators in the top three layers of Fig. 1 are the outcomes of dynamics that occur at a more detailed level (bottom two layers). The carbon intensity of fossil-fuel combustion (layer 3) can be reduced by substituting coal with natural gas or with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS; layer 4). The share of fossil fuels in energy use (layer 3) can be decreased by replacing fossil fuels with renewables (layer 4). The diffusion of new technologies may require longer-term investments 19 , which may be tracked 9 via private and public investments 16 , price declines 8 , and deployment
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(layer 5). More rapid technological progress would support and drive increased ambition of country pledges. We explore this nested structure using global and countrylevel data (Fig. 1) . We focus on the Kaya-derived indicators: CO 2 emissions (layer 1); GDP, energy intensity of GDP (for example, energy efficiency), and CO 2 per energy unit (layer 2); and CO 2 intensity of fossil fuels and share of fossil fuels in total energy use (layer 3). These indicators are the most relevant for the current slowdown in CO 2 emissions growth 11 , are important indicators in low-emission scenarios 20 , and cover energy-related indicators used in the NDCs. We focus on CO 2 emissions from the energy system, representing 70% of global GHG emissions in 2010 5 . The drivers are different 5 for non-CO 2 GHGs, such as agriculture, and CO 2 emissions not derived from energy use, such as cement (5%) and land-use change (10% total CO 2 emissions).
A decomposition of the world and key countries ( Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 1) shows that, over long periods, growth in GDP (green) has exerted upward pressure on CO 2 emissions, in most cases only partially offset by downward pressure from improved energy intensity of GDP (purple) and lower carbon intensity of energy (orange). Country trajectories differ, but when averaging over years to decades to remove interannual variability, three developments are particularly relevant for changes in emission trajectories ( Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Second, improvements in the energy intensity of GDP (Fig. 2, purple) have ensured that energy use has grown more slowly than GDP ( Supplementary Fig. 2 ). The declines in energy intensity are an important long-term trend as economies develop, become more efficient, and shift to services 5 . Third, there are signs of emerging declines in carbon intensity of energy globally, in China and the US, and of continual declines in the EU28 (Fig. 2, orange) . The declining energy and carbon intensities ensure that CO 2 emissions grow at a slower rate than GDP (Fig. 2, black line) .
Emission scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement (Fig. 3,  top) show that stringent climate policy is expected to only slightly accelerate historical improvements in energy intensity compared to baseline scenarios. In contrast, the scenarios indicate that significant mitigation is achieved by deep and sustained reductions in the carbon intensity of energy (Fig. 3, bottom) . Identifying signs of emerging downward trends in the carbon intensity of energy (Fig. 2) could be an early indicator of progress in mitigation.
Due to the importance of carbon intensity of energy in emission scenarios and for emerging trends, we decompose the carbon intensity of energy (Fig. 2, orange) into the share of fossil fuels in total energy use and carbon intensity of fossil-fuel combustion (Level 3 in Fig. 1; Fig. 4 ). The trends vary by country 21 , indicating the The missing data before 1995 is because there is no GDP data for the EU28 before 1990. Growth in GDP exerts upward pressure on emissions, energy e ciency (energy/GDP) exerts downward pressure, and in recent years, carbon intensity (CO 2 /energy) exerts downward pressure. 'Cross' is a negligible interaction term (see Methods). See Supplementary Fig. 1 for a non-smoothed version.
effectiveness of different factors. China has shown a decline in the share of fossil fuels in total energy use (orange) driven by renewables growth, with continual improvements in the carbon emitted per unit of fossil fuel (green) due to a declining coal share. The US shows declines in carbon per unit of fossil fuel consumed (green) representing the gains from a shift from coal to natural gas, with smaller reductions from growth in renewables (orange). Results for the US are consistent with an earlier study 15 , but we find that Historically, and in the long term, energy/GDP has trended downwards and the 2 • C scenarios suggest only a slightly higher energy intensity of GDP improvement compared to the baselines. The scenarios indicate that most future mitigation is due to reductions in CO 2 /energy, and this partly explains our focus on this term in our analysis.
substituting coal with gas is more important than the expansion of renewables 22 (Fig. 4) . The EU carbon intensity decline is dominated by the growing share of renewables in total energy use (orange), with decreasing gains from the carbon emitted from fossil-fuel use (green). There are no clear trends in India. Globally, after a period of rapid recarbonization 6 in the 2000s, there appears to be an emerging trend of declining carbon intensity, primarily driven by an increased share of non-fossil energy sources, consistent with requirements of 2
• C scenarios (Fig. 3, bottom) . Despite the improvements in the carbon intensity of energy, and its components (Fig. 4) , energy use remains the dominant driver of CO 2 emissions (Supplementary Fig. 3 ). Although there has been strong growth in solar and wind power recently, the growth in global energy use has largely been dominated by increases in fossil-fuel use and, to a lesser extent, nuclear and hydropower ( Supplementary  Fig. 4) . Because of the recent decline in Chinese coal use 12 , the contribution of renewables growth to total energy growth was remarkably large globally in 2015 (∼50%). In recent years, the use of fossil fuels in the US and EU declined, and the relative contributions of the growth in wind and solar power are significant and, in some years, dominant.
The recent gains in renewable energy use are significant, but it will be difficult for renewable energy to supply the entire annual growth in total energy use in the short term unless growth in global energy use further declines. If the annual growth in total energy use remains stable or declines, global CO 2 emissions are likely to remain flat or even decline. A return to stronger GDP and energy growth could lead to renewed growth in emissions through increased capacity utilization of existing coal power plants and rapid construction of new ones 23 . Policies locking in the recent reductions in coal use and avoiding new capacity additions 12 can potentially avert a rebound 18 . Future changes in the carbon intensity of energy (Fig. 3) will be driven by the development and deployment of alternative technologies (Level 4, Fig. 1 ). Scenarios consistent with the Paris goal require a decreasing fossil-fuel share in energy use (Fig. 5a) . Despite the large increase in fossil energy use in the past decades, current fossil energy trends remain consistent with many 2 • C scenarios ( Supplementary Fig. 5 ). For this consistency to continue, declines in fossil energy, particularly coal, need to be initiated soon, particularly given existing infrastructure lock-in 24 . The relatively high fossil energy use in many 2
• C scenarios is predicated on large-scale deployment of CCS (ref. 25) (Fig. 5b) . In addition, most scenarios require strong growth in bioenergy (Fig. 5d) , a large share of which is linked with CCS for carbon dioxide removal 25, 26 . It is uncertain whether bioenergy can be sustainably produced and made carbon-neutral at the scales required 27, 28 . Compounding this, without large-scale CCS deployment, most models cannot produce emission pathways consistent with the 2 • C goal 20, 26 . Despite its importance, CCS deployment has continued to lag behind expectations 13 . Emission scenarios require a rapid ramp-up of CCS facilities, potentially 4000 facilities by 2030 ( Fig. 5b and Supplementary Fig. 6 ), compared to the tens currently proposed by 2020 29 . Given the lack of focus on CCS in emission pledges 7 , a globally coordinated effort is needed to accelerate progress 13 , better understand the technological risks 25 , and address social acceptability 30 . Renewable energies are currently tracking well with the requirements of most 2
• C emission scenarios (Fig. 5) . Despite the extraordinary growth rates of wind and solar in recent years, LETTERS greatly accelerated expansion is required in the next decades. Most scenarios have limited scope for large-scale hydropower expansion due to geophysical constraints. Further, most scenarios indicate strong growth in nuclear energy, but there is renewed uncertainty from the drop in public support since the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. Scenarios indicate that renewables alone may not be sufficient to stay below 2
• C given physical constraints to large-scale deployment and the need to offset emissions in some sectors 20 , such as agriculture.
Current trends in many indicators appear broadly consistent with many of the emission scenarios that limit warming to well below 2
• C (Fig. 5 ), but this masks four critical issues. First, studies clearly show that up to 2030, current emission pledges quickly deviate from what is required to be consistent with the Paris goal 1 . Second, current trends of some key technologies (for example, CCS) deviate substantially from long-term requirements to meet the Paris goal. Third, if some technologies lag considerably behind expectations 13 or requirements 20 , then other technologies will need more rapid deployment and higher penetration levels into energy systems, a particularly important constraint for carbon dioxide removal 25 . Fourth, there is the lack of scenarios exploring opportunities and challenges of transformational lifestyle and behavioural changes, low CCS and high renewables 31 , alternative forms of carbon dioxide removal 26, 32 and solar radiation management 33 . The nested structure we have demonstrated and applied ( Fig. 1) facilitates the tracking of key indicators that need significant change to avoid 2
• C of warming. The methodology allows consistent and robust decomposition of current emissions, energy, and technology trends, and helps identifying key policy needs. We argue that extending tracking across indicators, scales, and time periods will increase the likelihood that policies will be implemented that ensure the societal transition consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Methods
Methods, including statements of data availability and any associated accession codes and references, are available in the online version of this paper.
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Methods Hierarchical framework. The framework is not unique and different indicators can be used depending on the focus. We have chosen to focus on primary energy, although final energy could be used to incorporate efficiency losses in energy conversion and end-use efficiency. We have included fossil CCS in the carbon intensity indicator, as electricity is still produced from fossil fuels, but with lower emissions. We have not included carbon dioxide removal (for example, afforestation, direct air capture) unless it leads to energy production (for example, BECCS).
Kaya identity.
We apply the Kaya Identity in our core analysis
where C is CO 2 emissions from fossil-fuel use, G is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant prices, E is total primary energy use (fossil-and non-fossil fuels), I E is the energy use per unit GDP (energy intensity of GDP), and I C is the carbon emissions per unit energy use (carbon intensity of energy). We do not include population as a separate component, and instead focus on aggregated GDP. We find it is useful to further decompose the carbon intensity of energy,
where E F is the fossil primary energy use, F i is the carbon intensity of fossil-fuel use and F s is the share of fossil-fuel use in total energy use.
Decomposition. We performing Index Decomposition Analysis 35 (IDA) as we do not aim to assess structural changes. Further, we keep the number of components in each decomposition low to avoid difficulties interpreting the driver of changes 36 . A decomposition with n factors has n! unique decompositions and there are a variety of ways of dealing with non-uniqueness. We take standard forward differences and keep the interaction terms separate. As an example of a two-factor decomposition, f = xy, f (t) = y(t) x + x(t) y + x y where x(t) = x(t + t) − x(t). The strength of this approach is that in Each term is the standard annual growth rate (in percent) of each factor and the magnitude of the interaction term can be isolated to assess its implications 36 . For example, for each year in Fig. 2 the growth rate of CO 2 emissions is the sum of the growth rates of GDP, energy intensity, and carbon intensity, with a small interaction term (labelled 'cross'). Our approach is most relevant for historical, and short-to medium-term trends. If emissions cross zero, then the method may need to be revised.
